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0037-7abstract Technology is fundamental to and embedded in the way practice is
conceptualized and institutionalized in social service work. Many scholars assume
and expect that good practices of care are achieved with the correct application
of theory produced by rigorous scientiﬁc research. However, there are signiﬁcant
critiques of this viewpoint. We examine the work of Donald Schön and Martin Hei-
degger and agree with these authors’ suggestions that technical rationality and
modern technology are not the way to achieve good practice in the human services.
At the same time, we are not convinced that the alternatives offered by Schön (art-
istry) and Heidegger (techne) provide what good practice requires. We draw on
Aristotle’s account of the intellectual virtues and make the case for phronesis and
praxis as other possibilities for inspiring new kinds of social welfare practice in
the twenty-ﬁrst century.introduction
It has become almost commonplace to hear our time described in terms
that draw attention to the role played by newdigital technologies.The pub-
lication of articles and books with titles like “The Second Digital Revolu-
tion” (Barnatt 2001), “The InformationRevolution” (Cote 2010), or theDig-
ital Disruption (McQuivey 2013) suggests that many commentators are in
furious agreement that the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century has been
marked by rapid and extensive technological disruption that is likely to,Service Review (June 2017). © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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| Social Service Review320or that already has, occasioned social and economic change on a scale that
far eclipses any antecedent. Rob Livingstone (2015, 1), for example, argues
that while disruptive technologies are nothing new, “what is newnow is the
speed, extent and unpredictability of modern digital technology-induced
disruption, and that this rate of change is dramatically increasing.”
No less alarming, or exciting, is the proposition that the new order ush-
ered in by the digital disruption will invert the relationship established in
the past few millennia in which humans used technology as technology
starts to use humans. Predictions such as the claim that many high-skilled
professions will be transformed by the new digital and robotic technolo-
gies (Brooke 2012) are now being taken seriously. Indeed, Richard Suss-
kind and David Susskind (2015) predict that in an Internet society, citizens
will neither need norwant doctors, teachers, accountants, architects, clergy,
consultants, or lawyers to practice in theways they did in the twentieth cen-
tury. Others claim that many human service professions will be similarly
transformed by the affordances of new technologies (Watling and Rogers
2012; Reamer 2013).1
This often breathless commentary has a powerful elective afﬁnity with
someolder dispositions found inmanyﬁelds of professional practice.2 Tech-
nology itself has been, and continues to be, typically understood and em-
bedded in social service work.To help the reader better understand our ap-
proach to thinking about technology,we distinguish between two dominant
understandings.technology as knowledge
The ﬁrst understanding of technology that we consider is captured by the
Oxford Dictionary’s primary deﬁnition of technology as “The application
of scientiﬁc knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.”3
This conception treats technology as knowledge and, in the human ser-
vices, involves a technical-rational understanding of knowledge evident
in the constitutive assumption that good practice is achieved by the cor-1. A sober assessment of the likely inﬂuence of digital automation is provided by Adam
Corlett (2016).
2. The idea of elective afﬁnity, following Max Weber, points to a set of important corre-
spondences between social phenomena that are not in any strict sense causal.
3. See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/english/technology.
Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice | 321rect application of theory produced by rigorous scientiﬁc research. This
understanding typically relies on a positivist framing of knowledge and as-
sumes, for example, that the social world, and more particularly the prob-
lems that socialwelfare dealswith, can be knownand responded to by knowl-
edge of entities and processes that are empirically accessible, are regular,
and behave in law-like or probabilistic ways.This conception of knowledge
has had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on how social services are conceptualized
and realized. This conception informs evidence-based practice, the ﬁeld
of knowledge utilization, and implementation science (Campbell Collabora-
tion n.d.; Early Intervention Foundation n.d.; Reamer 1993; Osmond and
O’Connor 2006; Michie, Stralen, and West 2011; Gambrill 2013; Cochrane
Collaboration 2015; Heinsch, Gray, and Sharland 2016). Perhaps this idea
of technology as knowledge is most typically manifested in many kinds of
caring work as the reliance on professional practice manuals, assessment
tools, or instruments, including psychometric tests, intervention handbooks,
best practice frameworks, client data management systems, and outcomes
measurement guides.technology as tool
The second understanding of technology that we consider, running in par-
allel with the representation of technology as knowledge, is the idea of
technology as a tool that involves both hardware and software.4 The idea
of technology as a tool is evident in such practice innovations as distance,
telephone, online, and video counseling; digitalized medical diagnostics; av-
atar therapy; case management software; advances in assistive, adaptive,
and rehabilitative technologies; and the use of information and communi-
cations technology in social service education, medical practice, and train-
ing (Kincaid 2004; Martin and Hawkins 2010; Perron et al. 2010; Reamer
2012, 2015; Berzin, Singer, and Chan 2015). Judith Bessant (2003, 2004)
provides another example of technology embedded in human service prac-
tice, pointing to the role played by risk technologies. According to Bessant,
scientiﬁcally produced instruments, techniques, tools, and procedures are4. In this respect, the distinction drawn between technology as knowledge and technol-
ogy as a tool is permeable. Some of the instruments that could be categorized as technology
as knowledge, like psychometric tests, are easily programmed into computerized form as
apps, and so they also become technology as tools.
| Social Service Review322used extensively to identify who is at risk and to assess the type and level of
risk, all with a view to determining the sort of riskmanagement or interven-
tion required (see also Dean 2010). This has proved irresistible to those
promoting a preventive justice agenda.
These dispositions probably explain contemporary advocacy both for
what is called evidence-based policy and practice and for the adoption of
digital technology in various kinds of human service work (ReachOut.com
n.d.; Australian Government Department of Human Services 2015; ehead-
space 2015). Lesley Chenoweth andDonnaMcAuliffe (2012, 260–62) argue
that “advances in technology affect human service practice,” and their dis-
cussion focuses on technology as a tool used in practice with a particular
emphasis on telecommunications and information technology. This advo-
cacy assumes the potential of technology to variously solve problems, im-
prove the lives of human beings, savemoney, and deliver efﬁcient and high-
quality services (ARACY n.d.; CSIRO n.d.; Slavin and Schoech 1999; Young
and Well Cooperative Research Centre 2013). While we are dealing with
both technology as knowledge and technology as a tool, we are interested
in the kinds of intellectual and ethical assumptions people makewhen they
think about or use a technological frame of reference.
As Steve Matthewman notes, although “ubiquity creates invisibility,”
we can ill afford to be complacent about the actual value of digital technol-
ogy simply because “we do not notice the obvious” (Matthewman 2011,
173). Neil Selwyn, writing about the inﬂuence of digital technology on ed-
ucation, is even more pointed when he argues that we need a more critical,
even political, framework when thinking about new technology. He warns
that too many professionals working in education simply assume, without
good reasons or compelling evidence, that new technology will be benevo-
lent or will promote efﬁciency, choice, and diversity (Selwyn 2014). Selwyn
treats this as one consequence of an evangelical movement of advocates
promoting the beneﬁts of the new technology (Selwyn 2014).
We are inclined to agree with Matthewman (2011) and Selwyn (2014).
Apart from some good reasons to worry about the claimed beneﬁts of the
new technology, this advocacy for a digital ﬁx seems, among other failures,
to conspicuously ignore or overlook the ongoing crisis that has been affect-
ing many human service professions over the past few decades. This crisis
includes a loss of trust and faith in the profession and the failure of the
professions to solve critical problems (Schön 1983; Schwartz and Sharpe
2011). That crisis is an entirely appropriate context for thinking both about
Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice | 323what has happened to professional practice to occasion that sense of crisis
and the likelihood that the new technology will automatically contribute to
an outbreak of good practice. We believe that social service professionals
need to think more carefully about what we mean by good practice.
In 2011, Barry Schwartz and Ken Sharpe wrote an acclaimed critique of
modern professions, including medicine, law, social welfare, and educa-
tion, in America. They point to evidence that Americans in general, and
people relying on medical, social welfare, legal, or education professionals
in particular,were not happy. In America, a 2012 Gallup poll reported that
only 29 percent of Americans had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of conﬁ-
dence in public schools.This was half the conﬁdence level reported (58 per-
cent) in 1973 when Gallup ﬁrst asked the question about public schools.
They point to teachers whowant “to teach kids the basics” and excite them
about the prospect of educating themselves but who “feel helpless faced
with the challenge of reconciling these goals with mandates to meet targets
on standardized tests, to adopt speciﬁc teaching techniques, and to keep up
with the ever increasing paperwork. No one is satisﬁed—not the profes-
sionals and not their clients” (Sharpe and Schwartz 2011, 3). Through the
ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Gallup polls also found that 72 per-
cent ofAmericanswere dissatisﬁedwith the availability of affordable health-
care, while 50 percent were dissatisﬁed with the quality of medical care.
In Britain, only 43 percent were satisﬁed with their access to affordable
healthcare, and only 42 percent were satisﬁed with the quality of that care.
This general point about a loss of conﬁdence or faith in modern profes-
sions needs a lot more careful discussion of much more evidence than we
can present here. However,we do engage with the question of why people
would put so much trust or faith in a mix of technical rationality and/or in
technological solutions.We treat people’s faith in technical rationality and
technology as two closely related themes suggested by history since the
eighteenth century and the Age of Reason (or the Enlightenment) ﬁrst set
loose the idea that humanity was now surging into the future on a tide of
progress powered by (modern) science and technology (Henry 2008). This
idea and a telos (or purpose) of progress have been tirelessly promoted by
early advocates like Marquis de Condorcet and Auguste Comte, as well as
bymore recent advocates for globalization.The idea that progress is powered
by technology has also been shadowed by mordant critics like Theodor W.
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and, more recently, John Gray. Here, we focus
on the ideas of a surprising pair of critics of technology: Martin Heidegger
| Social Service Review324(1977) and Donald Schön (1983, 1987). Each has made an important contri-
bution to howwemight think about theway inwhichwe rely on both com-
placent representation of technology (Heidegger) and a conception of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge (Schön). Each helps us begin to think about what good
practice might look like for social welfare professionals.
In this article,we address several questions.Was Schön right to point to
a problem with a technical rational model of theory and professional prac-
tice?What does Heidegger’s account of technology imply about good prac-
tice, especially practice based on the premise that a technological solu-
tion is available? We explore the idea that technology has a role to play in
achieving good practice in human services and examine whether technol-
ogy is the answer to the puzzle of realizing good practice in human service
professions.donald schön: the crisis of professional practice
In 1983, Donald Schön, a philosopher and professor of urban planning at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published one of the most widely
admired books on professional practice in the twentieth century: The Re-
ﬂective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action.5 Schön (1983) is in-
terested in how to achieve good professional practice, and this includes ex-
amining the kinds of knowledge best suited to inform good practice. In
particular, Schön explores the relationship between knowing and doing, re-
search and practice, and thinking and acting. Schön’s book is about how
professional lawyers, teachers, doctors, social workers, and urban designers
think about and try to link their practice and theory. Schön argues that there
is strong evidence of a conspicuous and widespread failure on the part of
these professions to live up to their stated ethical values, to meet the expec-
tations of their communities, and to solvemajor social problems like poverty,
illness, injustice, and dysfunctional cities. He claims that this failure was ev-
ident even in the 1960s and 1970s.
Schön attributes this failure to the way in which many professionals
treat theory as a technical form of knowledge based in pure science,which
they then use to guide their practice. In effect, he is saying that too many5. Others have elaborated on Schön’s (1983) critique (see, e.g., Grundy 1987; Dunne 1997,
2005; Thompson 2000; Flyvbjerg 2001; Eisner 2002; Carr 2004; Polkinghorne 2004; Hamil-
ton 2005; Schwandt 2005; Kemmis and Smith 2008; Bondi et al. 2011).
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structions for building an electronic device or for using a child’s Lego set
to build a spaceship or train.We think Schön’s argument is worthy of fur-
ther exploration in part because he opens up discussion about what we
mean when we talk about theory and practice.6
According to Schön,most professions have a story about how their theory
and practice work that is reliant on what he calls technical rationality. Schön
(1983, 21) argues: “According to themodel of Technical Rationality—the view
of professional knowledge which has most powerfully shaped both our
thinking about the professions and the institutional relations of research,
education, and practice—professional activity consists in instrumental prob-
lem solving made rigorous by the application of scientiﬁc theory and tech-
nique.”The technical rationalmodel suggests that goodprofessional practice
relies on practitioners exclusively and correctly using knowledge produced
by scientiﬁc research to achieve predetermined and agreed-upon ends. Ac-
cording to Schön (1983, 3–4), “Technical rationality holds that practitioners
are instrumental problem solvers who select technical means best suited to
particular purposes. Rigorous professional practitioners solve well-formed
instrumental problems by applying theory and technique derived from sys-
tematic, preferably scientiﬁc knowledge.”
Schön argues that toomanymodern professionals treat theory as a body
of clearly bounded, scientiﬁc, specialized, and standardized knowledge.
This conception of theory relies on what has conventionally been referred
to as the positivist conception of knowledge.This is an idea that evolved in
the early nineteenth century, and it insists that the onlyway to saywe know
the truth of anything is if we have measured it and, preferably, subjected it
to some kind of experimental procedure. Under positivism, anything that
looks like it has to do with religion, feelings, or ethical ideas should be
counted out as not being scientiﬁc. For positivists since Comte (who coined
the term), the only true knowledge is grounded in a scientiﬁc experimental
method. As Schön (1983, 31) puts it, “Technical rationality is the heritage of
Positivism.”
The three principal doctrines of positivism that were ﬁrst outlined by
Comte help us to understand technical rationality’s reach and inﬂuence.6. It is important to note that the words theory and practice are often used and misused
with an almost callous disregard for the confusion set loose, because those using these words
cannot, or refuse to be, clear about what these words mean.
| Social Service Review326First, there is the conviction that empirical science is not just a form of
knowledge but is the only source of positive knowledge of the world. Sec-
ond, there is the intention to cleanse people’s minds of mysticism, supersti-
tion, and other forms of pseudo-knowledge. Finally, there is the program of
extending scientiﬁc knowledge and technical control to human society, to
make technology, as Comte said, “no longer exclusively geometrical, me-
chanical or chemical, but also and primarily political and moral” (Schön
1983, 32).
The scientiﬁc method,when properly applied, avoids making religious,
ethical, or emotional assumptions because proper science is grounded in
empirical observation and rigorous mathematical testing in order to pro-
duce objective, timeless, invariant, and universal laws (Holton 1988). The-
oretical knowledge is, accordingly, best expressed as laws that ideally use
equations and mathematical formulations, and it is successful when an ex-
planation also works as a prediction written out as a theorem (Schön 1983).
Whether it is either possible or desirable that we generate this kind of the-
ory in the human sciences is another matter altogether.Yet,what some call
“physics envy” has proved highly seductive.
As Schön goes on to explain, professional doctors, teachers, psychol-
ogists, town planners, and social workers claim to draw on a body of theory
to develop more applied versions of that theory. This requires developing
day-to-day diagnostic procedures and problem-solving techniques crafted
into skill-based practices and accompanied by appropriate attitudes (like the
doctor’s “bedside manner”) and professional values like altruism. Accord-
ing to this point of view, professional practice is a second-order activity sub-
ordinate to theory. It follows that the more basic and fundamental the scien-
tiﬁc theory, the higher the status of the profession relying on that science.
As Schön points out, this model of professionalism was already facing
major problems by the 1980s. First, positivism itself had already fallen into
disfavor among twentieth-century scientists andmathematicians in the rev-
olution led by Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Godel. That
revolution, which included the theory of relativism and quantum physics,
suggested that some core features of the universe could not be explained
by the kind of classic scientiﬁc methods favored by positivism and that con-
temporary science needed to accept a degree of uncertainty (Heisenberg)
and even mathematical undecidability (Godel). This view was recognized
by Karl Popper (1979) and Thomas Kuhn (2012) and has recently been de-
scribed by Marcus du Sautoy (2016).
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ing a crisis of legitimacy. For Schön, the central problem is the assumption,
made by too many professionals relying on the technical rational model as
a self-portrait, that the problems they address are technical problems. As
Schön puts it, “Technical rationality depends on agreement about ends.
When ends are ﬁxed and clear then the decision to act can present itself
as an instrumental problem” (Schön 1983, 41).
But what if the problems being dealt with by professionals were nei-
ther ﬁxed nor clear? Worse,what if the problems being dealt with by pro-
fessionals involved a complex set of ethical, emotional, aesthetic, or polit-
ical judgments? This might go to a standard problem facing any doctor who
has a patient facing deathwho he or she can technically save but whowould
be left in lifelong pain and suffering. Or, it might involve a planning deci-
sion that half of a small community wants but the other half loathes: how
does a planner resolve such a problem?
As Schön argues, real professionals in every ﬁeld need tomake complex
judgments that acknowledge the fact that they are working in communities
divided by economic, gendered, religious, and ethnic interests, differences,
and inequalities.This implies that even working out the nature of the prob-
lem often relies on a mix of technical and nontechnical and nonrational
abilities. This recognition led Schön to propose that professional practice
be redeﬁned as reﬂective practice.
One further observation is warranted. Schön’s account of the domi-
nance of technical rationality in professional practice is as relevant today
as it was when it was published more than 30 years ago, if not more so.
The research, education, and practice of professional activities continue to
resemble the model of technical rationality that Schön describes. If any-
thing, there has been an intensiﬁcation of research, education, and practice
modeled on technical rationality since Schön wrote his seminal work.This
has corresponded with the institutional reign of neoliberalism and New
PublicManagement,which have become the dominant political, economic,
and policy framework formany liberal welfare states like Britain, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand since the 1970s (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017). And, unsurprisingly, neoliberalism
andNewPublicManagement are interdependent with technical rational-
ity, a link acknowledged extensively in the literature (Bessant 2004; Mil-
ler and Rose 2008; Dean 2010). One way this can be observed is through
the sort of research that is valorized and respected by governments and
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like the evidence-based practice movement, claims to provide the knowl-
edge and theory (through robust and rigorous research methods that are
claimed to be able to precisely and unambiguously know, measure, ex-
plain, and predict) that is needed for the cost-efﬁcient, value-for-money,
auditable, and accountable service provision demanded by neoliberalism
and New Public Management (see, e.g., Power 1997; Furedi 2011). We
should also remember that the potential of technology was central to social-
ist and communist projects. It appears that technology has been critical to
diverse and disparate social, economic, and political systems.the solution according to schön: artistry
and reﬂective practice
While Schön (1983, 1987) highlights some of the problemswith a technical-
rational model of theory and professional practice, he also observes that
the sort of knowledge that many practitioners actually use for good profes-
sional practice has not been clearly articulated. According to Schön (1983,
1987), technical rationality is not the way of knowing that is needed for
good practice, and practitioners who do not practice according to its logic
are unable to talk about the knowledge they actually use in their practice,
which is characterized by “complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness,
and value conﬂict” (Schön 1983, 39). Schön (1983, 19–20) argues:
Professionals have been disturbed to ﬁnd that they cannot account for
processes they have come to see as central to professional competence.
It is difﬁcult for them to imagine how to describe and teach what might be
meant by making sense of uncertainty, performing artistically, setting
problems, and choosing among competing professional paradigms, when
these processes seem mysterious in light of the prevailing model of profes-
sional knowledge.We are bound to an epistemology of practice which
leaves us at a loss to explain, or even describe, the competences to which
we now give overriding importance.
In light of his critique of professional practice modeled on technical ra-
tionality, Schön (1983) argues for the value of an inquiry into the episte-
mology of practice. According to Schön (1983), this would involve asking
questions like, “What is the kind of knowing in which competent practi-
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kinds of knowledge presented in academic textbooks, scientiﬁc papers, and
learned journals?” (Schön 1983, viii). Schön undertakes a phenomenology
of professional practice to learn about the epistemology of practice. This
involves asking “what we can learn from a careful examination of artistry,
that is, the competence by which practitioners actually handle indetermi-
nate zones of practice” (Schön 1987, 13).
Schön makes the case for an epistemology of practice based on the idea
of artistry, which he characterizes as “an exercise of intelligence” and “a
kind of knowing” that involves “an art of problem framing, an art of imple-
mentation, and an art of improvisation—all necessary to mediate the use in
practice of applied science and technique” (Schön 1987, 13). Schön seems
to be treating the kind of knowing professionals use as a kind of art best
distinguished from the model of theory that the technical-rational model
of professional practice relies upon.
According to Schön (1983, 62), reﬂection in action is central to “the art
through which practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome ‘diver-
gent’ situations of practice.” In other words, Schön argues that a key aspect
of good practice is artistry, or performing artistically, in “the indeterminate
zones of practice—uncertainty, uniqueness, and value-conﬂicts—[that] es-
cape the canons of technical rationality” (Schön 1987, 6). And such artful
practice involves reﬂection in action, or reﬂective practice. According to
Schön (1983, 68–69),when a practitioner is performing artistically and en-
gaging in reﬂective practice, he or she becomes “a researcher in the practice
context” and constructs “a new theory of each unique case.” This involves
practitioners allowing themselves to experience surprise, puzzlement, or
confusion in the practice situations that they ﬁnd uncertain or unique, re-
ﬂecting on the phenomena before them and carrying out an experiment
that serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomena and
a change in the situation (Schön 1983).
The real value of Schön’s (1983, 1987) work is his focus on spelling out
the sort of knowledge people use in professional practice. Schön makes the
case that good professional practice requires artistry and the nurturing of
artistry in the education and the institutionalization of practice. And he par-
ticularly makes the case for the reﬂective practicum in professional educa-
tion for this purpose (Schön 1987).
Although Schön’s account of reﬂective practice still has lessons for us
today, Schön is not always as clear as he might have been in saying how
| Social Service Review330this reﬂection might best take place and, more importantly, why reﬂec-
tive practice is worth pursuing. Schön’s solution of a turn to practice is not
grounded in any clear or defensible critical, political, or ethical ideas or com-
mitments. He fails to spell out the kinds of ethical ideas that might matter
in deﬁning the point and purpose of any professional practice. Schön is
reluctant to detail the kinds of ethical thinking that might make reﬂective
practice a good idea. In this respect, and by implication,we need some better
ﬂeshed-out accounts of the kinds of human goods that professional practice
is oriented to achieving or promoting.7 Almost as problematic, though much
less important, is that when Schön describes reﬂective practice, he draws
on a narrow slice of professional practice: all of his examples come from
American universities or colleges. Although this sounds like very harsh crit-
icism, in effect Schön unwittingly contributes a little to the mess in which
we now ﬁnd ourselves by virtue of his unwillingness to provide examples
of the kinds of value rationality that would address the untenable claim to
value neutrality made by those advocating for a technical rational model
of professional practice.martin heidegger: the dangers
of a technological ﬁx
Let us turn then to the German twentieth-century philosopher Martin
Heidegger, who is easily one of the towering and most controversial ﬁg-
ures in Western philosophy and someone who is not conventionally iden-
tiﬁed as having made a contribution to ethical philosophy.8 Heidegger is
critical of modern technology. Can he illuminate the kinds of ethical, po-
litical, and critical ideas and commitments that might go a long way to de-
ﬁning and realizing good professional practice? Let us start by outlining
his radical challenge to the way we know technology.7. This clearly points to a set of interconnected problems to do with (i) how we might
begin to develop such a framework based on a defensible conception of human goods, (ii) what
those human goods might look like, and (iii) whether there are any guides to this in the various
traditions that make up the history of practical reasoning.
8. The controversy about Heidegger goes to the question of howmuch his philosophy en-
abled his notorious embrace of Nazism in 1933–35 (seeWolin 1993; Safranski 1998).The ques-
tion of Heidegger’s ethical position is controversial for different reasons (see Webb 2011;
Artemenko 2016).
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practice. However, just as Schön has a lot to say about scientiﬁc knowl-
edge, Heidegger has a lot to say about technology. In particular, Heidegger
is interested in exploring the essence of modern technology and its impli-
cations for human beings. But what does Heidegger mean by the essence
of modern technology? And what are the problems of the essence of mod-
ern technology for people? And are the essence of modern technology and
its associated problems evident in the practices of the helping professions?
We will address each of these questions in turn to make the case that Hei-
degger’s critique of modern technology is relevant for thinking about the
prospects of human service practice embracing modern technology.the essence of technology according to heidegger
Heidegger (1977) argues that the conventional ways in which technology
has been understood are correct. However, he believes that they do not
capture the truth or essence of technology. In particular, Heidegger argues
that treating technology as a means to an end and as a human activity,which
he calls the instrumental and anthropological deﬁnition of technology, is
“in principle untenable” because it diverts attention from considering its
essence (Heidegger 1977, 21, 32). Heidegger (1977) argues that the essence
of technology is a mode of revealing, or a realm of truth, or a way of under-
standing or unconcealing, or a “destining” that works to reveal. Heidegger
stresses this point when he suggests, “The possibility of all productive man-
ufacturing . . . ,” and this includes the possibility of all ends and means or
instrumentality, and the possibility of all making and manipulating, “lies
in revealing” (Heidegger 1977, 12–13).9
Heidegger (1977, 14–24) argues that the mode of revealing that rules in
modern technology, compared to the mode of revealing that ruled in the
Middle Ages and Antiquity, is a challenging or ordering revealing, which
he calls enframing. Heidegger (1977, 16–24) characterizes enframing as a
revealing of nature, the world, objects, being, and “the real” that “has the9. Heidegger’s distinctive recovery and radical revision of Western approaches to truth in
which he recovers and appropriates the ancient Greek idea of truth and its relationship to the
concept aletheia (often translated and interpreted as unconcealment, disclosedness, reveal-
ing) is examined by Suvak (2000), Sheehan (2011), Malpas (2014), and Nicholson (2014a,
2014b).
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ticular, a challenging, setting upon, and ordering of the real as “standing-
reserve.” “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging,
which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that
can be extracted and stored as such” (Heidegger [1922/1923] 2007, 14). As
a standing reserve, the real is at people’s command as the disclosers of the
real as a standing reserve. In other words, the real is on call as resource or
potential that is ready to be unlocked and to deliver what people demand
of it. AsHeidegger (1977, 17, 23) explains, “Everywhere everything is ordered
to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so it may be
on call for a further ordering.Whatever is ordered about in this way has its
own standing.We call it the standing-reserve. . . .Enframing . . . is the way in
which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve.” ForHeidegger, the essence
ofmodern technology is its power to reveal, and in particular to challenge or
order, the real as calculable, orderable, and expected and ready to provide
whatever people require of it.the problems of enframing
Heidegger argues that enframing poses two dangers for people. The ﬁrst
is that “Enframing endangers man in his relationship to himself and to
everything that is” (Heidegger 1977, 27). Heidegger is particularly concerned
about the ways in which enframing reveals a reduced scope to, and a spe-
ciﬁcally ampliﬁed way of, being, including human being. More to the point,
Heidegger suggests that by enframing people end up conceiving of them-
selves and of other people as a standing reserve. And Heidegger adds that
people do not realize that they are being revealed as resource or potential
to be optimized and exploited. Heidegger (1977, 27) argues: “Man stands so
decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does
not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one
being spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respects
he ek-sists, from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or ad-
dress, and thus can never encounter only himself.”
According to Heidegger (1977, 27), the second danger of enframing is
that “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.” Put another way,
where enframing holds sway, every other possible mode of revealing is
concealed (Heidegger 1977). Heidegger argues that every mode of reveal-
ing involves concealing, and therefore every mode of revealing poses dan-
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ger” of enframing, which he argues rules when it comes to modern tech-
nology.
What is dangerous is not technology. . . . The essence of technology . . . is
the danger. . . .The threat to man does not come in the ﬁrst instance from
the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual
threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing
threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter
into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more
primal truth. (Heidegger 1977, 28)
Dreyfus (1993, 305) stresses the point: “Heidegger’s concern is the hu-
man distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather
than the destruction caused by speciﬁc technologies. . . . The threat is not
a problem for which we must ﬁnd a solution, but an ontological condition
that requires a transformation of our understanding of being” (italics in
original).
One important questionwemust consider is whetherHeidegger’s argu-
ments about the essence of technology and its dangers, which were deliv-
ered as lectures over 65 years ago and ﬁrst published soon after, are still
relevant today. Don Ihde (2010), for example, questions Heidegger’s rele-
vance in light of the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial epoch.
Ihde (2010, 21) is also critical of Heidegger’s “essentialism,” or subsuming
all technology under the same analysis that “keeps one from seeing partic-
ularities of technologies.”Heideggerwrote of the essence of technology at a
time when the dominant types of technology were mechanical and indus-
trial in form—what Ihde (2009, xii) describes as the “rust belt, smokestack
industrial technologies” characteristic of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen-
tury—and not when electronic, digital, knowledge-based, and “techno-
science” technologies were prevalent, as is the case now (Ihde 2010, 3).
Although we live in an age dominated by a different form of technology,
we argue that the new types of technology can still be conceived as having
an essence or a mode of revealing that is enframing and that poses dangers
for people, similar to the technology of Heidegger’s time in his interpreta-
tion. Others agree with our position that Heidegger’s account and critique
of the essence of technology remain important and useful (e.g., Marcuse
1964; Thomson 2000, 2009; Polkinghorne 2004; Feenberg 2005; Kisiel
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ger’s account of the essence of modern technology and subsequently with
our position.enframing in human service practice
Are the essence of modern technology (or enframing) and the dangers as-
sociated with it as described by Heidegger evident in practices of care?
Human service practice is implicated in revealing being in particular ways,
and often this is in the mode of enframing. According to Herbert Dreyfus
(1993, 306), “Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to
the welfare of all is not the solution to our problems but the culmination of
the technological understanding of being.” In other words, the perfected
welfare state where all resources, including human, have been efﬁciently
mobilized, calculated, and ordered to provide material welfare for all is en-
framing par excellence (Dreyfus 1993). Many critiques of modern welfare
emerge from and correspond with Heidegger’s account of enframing. In
particular, Heidegger’s intellectual work on technology inspired (for want
a better word) a radical left critique of welfare.10 Moreover, Heidegger has
been particularly inﬂuential on many theorists who critically assess mod-
ern welfare and human services; one who is most notable for our current
purpose is Michel Foucault (Foucault 1977, 1988, 1997; Bernstein 1991; Ir-
ving 2009; Powell 2013).
Timothy Rayner (2001) provides an example of the relationship be-
tween Heidegger and Foucault’s work, which hints at the way in which
enframing pervades social welfare systems and practices. According to
Rayner (2001, 142), “Heidegger and Foucault share the view that individu-
als in modern society are to some extent determined by technological
structures pervading that society. Both develop the idea that the basic char-
acter of these structures is to objectify and order the forces of life. Both
argue that the view of human beings as a kind of manipulable resource is
essential to the technological management of society.”10. There is a body of left radical critique of welfare professional practice that points to
the unwitting adoption or acceptance of neoliberal policy as well as the impact of new public
management on welfare professional practice. See Foster and Wilding (2000), Fraser (2012),
and Keating (2016).
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be an aspect or example of rationalities and technologies of modern gov-
ernment, or governmentality, that conceive of people as a resource or po-
tential that can be efﬁciently normalized, constrained, and optimized with
the right type of regulation, ordering, and discipline (Polkinghorne 2004;
Miller and Rose 2008; Dean 2010). Dreyfus (2004) has also discussed the
inﬂuences of Heidegger on Foucault’s work. For example, Dreyfus (2004)
suggests that Foucault’s critique of objectiﬁcation, normalization, govern-
mentality, and bio-power follows Heidegger’s critique of enframing and
modern technology. In particular, Dreyfus (2004) argues, “Foucault, like
Heidegger, is, of course, not opposed to modern welfare techniques . . .
but he is opposed to taking for granted that welfare practices, based on the
social sciences, should, in the name of efﬁciency and optimization, be ex-
tended without critical questioning to all aspects of our lives.”
Søren Riis (2009, 127) also suggests that a consequence of enframing is
the creation of “a manual for everything—including humans.” The preva-
lence of guides, frameworks, tip sheets, and handbooks also indicates that
the logic of enframing has captured human service practice. This discus-
sion, though limited, suggests that according to much analysis, enframing
offers a valuable heuristic for understanding and scrutinizing practices of
care. And this is particularly the case when human beings are conceived
and treated as human capital or human resources—things to be calculated
and ordered, subjects to be disciplined, assets to be used, and populations
to be optimized (Ihde 1979; Riis 2009; Thomson 2009; Emslie 2016). Sim-
ilar to Heidegger, Foucault suggests that when practices of care are entan-
gled with enframing, they limit human possibility while also emphasizing
particular ways of understanding human beings.These reductions and am-
pliﬁcations are a problem and suppress and subjugate alternative ways of
being.
We are not interested here in providing a comprehensive comparative
analysis of Heidegger and Schön’s accounts of modern technology and
technical rationality. At the same time, one aspect of both of their respec-
tive arguments is relevant to our interest in human service practice. Even
though Heidegger’s (1977) detailed description of modern science and its
essence is more sophisticated than Schön’s account of positivistic science,
both authors comment on the entanglement between their conceptualiza-
tions of science and technology in modern times. Heidegger (1977) argues
that enframing, as the essence of modern technology, preceded modern
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Heidegger (1977, 21–23), even though “modern technologymust employ ex-
act physical science,” the essence of modern technology is present in mod-
ern science and therefore modern technology occurred historically earlier.
Heidegger’s account of the relationship between modern physical science
and the essence of technology is the invert of how this relationship is typ-
ically understood. According to the aforementioned deﬁnition from the on-
line Oxford Dictionary (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition
/english/technology), technology is conceived of as “the application of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge for practical problems,” and this deﬁnition,which places
science before technology, aligns with Schön’s account of technical ratio-
nality. According to Heidegger and Schön, modern technology and techni-
cal rationality rely on science as an exact, calculable, and orderable way of
knowing and form of knowledge. And professional practice that is based on
modern technology or technical rationality is interdependent withmodern,
systematic, positivistic science and scientiﬁc knowledge. This being the
case, the same arguments Schön presents to critique professional activity
based on the model of technical rationality can be made to critique profes-
sional practice based on modern technology.the solution according to heidegger—art or TECHNE
According to Iain Thomson (2009, 157), “Heidegger insisted a real solution
demands not that we abandon our technological manipulation and control
of human beings (which he recognised will not happen in the foreseeable
future), but rather that we ﬁnd ways to integrate these technological proj-
ects for increasing self-optimization into our basic sense of self without al-
lowing this sense of self to be completely dominated by enframing’s opti-
mization imperative.” At the same time, Heidegger (1977, 26) makes the
case that it is in the essence of technology that we are to ﬁnd the alterna-
tive to enframing: “When we once open ourselves expressly to the essence
of technology, we ﬁnd ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim.”
Heidegger (1977, 29) argues that “in technology’s essence roots and thrives
the saving power” or “the promise” and thatwhenwe recognize and under-
stand the “supreme danger” of the essence of modern technology,we expe-
rience “the lightning-ﬂash of Being,” or what Dreyfus (1993, 308) describes
as a “sudden Gestalt switch,” and a “transformation in our understand-
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to enframing, which is simultaneously concealed by enframing, is a differ-
ent mode of revealing that enables the real to appear to people in a differ-
ent way.
In thinking about technology, Heidegger (1977) describes this other
mode of revealing the real as “bringing-forth” and argues that this is the sort
of revealing that was familiar to the Ancient Greeks, who called it poiesis.
According to Heidegger (1977, 7), one thing that was particular to poiesis
was its well-known four causes, which Heidegger argues were “the ways,
all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something
else.”12 In other words, Heidegger (1977, 6–11) argues that the four causes,
or the four ways of being responsible, or the four “modes of occasioning,”
are all at play within revealing as bringing forth or poiesis. Heidegger also
makes the case that a crucial difference between the two modes of reveal-
ing—bringing forth and challenging forth—is to dowith causality. In partic-
ular, Heidegger (1977, 23) argues that in modern times, “causality is shrink-
ing into a reporting—a reporting challenged forth—of standing reserve.”
John Henry (2008) and Keekok Lee (2009) similarly observe that Galileo11. It is reasonable to suggest that Heidegger’s analysis of technology took place not in
spite of, but rather as a result of, his initial support for and his later break with National So-
cialism (e.g., Dreyfus 1993). In light of this and Heidegger’s claim that it is in the essence of
technology that the saving power thrives, do we all need to engage with a political movement
such as Nazism that is an extreme expression of faith in technological ordering and planned
calculation to experience the “sudden Gestalt shift” or the lightening-ﬂash of Being, and
come to realize and appreciate the dangers of enframing and its alternative? Moreover,
how this sudden Gestalt shift takes place deserves further attention (see Dreyfus 1993).
12. Aristotle proposes four kinds of causes or explanations when we ask the question
“why?” According to traditional accounts of Aristotle’s Physics andMetaphysics (e.g., Aristotle
1996, 38–42; 2004, 12–15), Aristotle says that when we explain change or movement in matter,
it is determined by the material that composes the moving or changing things. Any change or
movement of a table is a consequence of its being made of wood. Second, we can also explain
any change or movement in form by its being caused by the arrangement, shape, or appearance
of the thing changing or moving. Aristotle says, for example, that if we explain an octave in mu-
sic, this is explained by the ratio 2∶1, and number in general. Third, if we want to know why
something has come into being,we look for an efﬁcient or moving cause. For example, the efﬁ-
cient cause of a table is a carpenter. Finally,we can explain why something does what it does in
terms of its end or purpose (telos). For a seed, for example, the purpose is to become an adult
plant. Heidegger ([1976] 1998, 1977) offers what he claims to be a more originary interpretation
of Aristotle’s four causes and that complicates and challenges typical translations and interpre-
tations.
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the four causes and actively promoted a narrower approach to causation
that emphasizes the material and efﬁcient causes because they lent them-
selves to measurement and quantiﬁcation.
Heidegger has more to say in his characterization of bringing forth
or poiesis. In particular, he describes poiesis’s relationship to the ancient
Greek idea of technology. According to Heidegger (1977, 12–13), “The word
[technology] stems from the Greek.Technikonmeans that which belongs to
techne. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this
word. One is that . . . Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis. . . . The
other point that we should observe with regard to techne . . . [is that] it is
as revealing . . . that techne is a bringing-forth.” In particular, Heidegger
(1977, 13) argues that the ancient Greek techne is a revealing “according
to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning.” Heidegger’s account
of the relationship between techne and poiesis aligns with Aristotle’s and
neo-Aristotelian accounts that suggest techne is the way of knowing most
suited to guide poiesis as the form of activity (Dunne 1997, 2005; Flyvbjerg
2001; Polkinghorne 2004; Aristotle 2009).
Heidegger adds that in ancient Greece, art was called techne. Heidegger
(1977, 34) argues: “Why did art bear the modest name techne? Because it
was revealing that brought forth and hither, and therefore belonged within
poiesis.”Heidegger then suggests that the alternative to themode of reveal-
ing that rules inmodern technology (enframing) is to be found in the bringing-
forth that was revealed by art as the ancient Greeks knew it. Heidegger (1977,
35) argues: “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological,
essential reﬂection upon technology and decisive confrontationwith it must
happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technol-
ogy and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art.”
Heidegger makes the case for a different essence or mode of revealing the
real compared to the mode of enframing or challenging forth that domi-
nates in modern technology. That different mode of revealing is a bringing-
forth mode of revealing, which is the type of revealing that ancient Greeks
called techne, or art, and that has the four modes of occasioning at play.
Because the four modes of occasioning are at play, art is not as reduction-
ist and amplifying of the speciﬁc in its revealing the real compared to en-
framing.
Heidegger examines technology and does not directly investigate good
professional practice like Schön does. At the same time, if enframing and
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argue, then this suggests that practice should be based on a different way
of revealing the real, and Heidegger proposes that this should be a mode
called art. However, Heidegger argues that the way to the alternative to en-
framing is through enframing. In light of criticisms of enframing,we are un-
sure if human service practice should be based on this way of revealing the
real. But if practice is not based on enframing, then, as Heidegger suggests,
we will not experience the transformation in how the real is revealed.This
circular argument is unresolvable and does not help us to think about and
pursue an alternative to professional practice based on a technological ﬁx.
Moreover, Heidegger’s failure to suggest some possibility for addressing en-
framing outside of enframing is an example ofwhat JürgenHabermas (1987)
describes as a totalizing critique that leads to performative contradictions,
a criticism Habermas leveled at Foucault.
Are there other ethical considerations in Heidegger’s work that might
help to deﬁne the point and purpose of a professional practice? Heidegger
(1993) argues that he does not provide an explicit ethical theory in his ac-
count of Being. He begins by asking, “Can we obtain from such knowledge
directives that can be readily applied to our active lives? The answer is
that such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass be-
fore this distinction. Such thinking is, insofar as it is, recollection of Being
and nothing else. . . . Such thinking has no result. It has no effect” (1993,
259). On this basis, Jeremy Wisnewski (2012, 57) argues, “Heidegger . . .
explicitly claims in several places in Being and Time that he is not interested
in providing an evaluative analysis of the modes of Dasein’s existence.” Ac-
cording to Sacha Golob (2015, 1), “Essentially his [Heidegger’s] view is that,
before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought
to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are.”
However, after getting clear on ontology, Heidegger does not return to this
question. As John Paley (2000, 68) argues, all moral theories or ontic alter-
natives meet the ontological condition of Dasein, and “Heideggermakes ab-
solutely no attempt to adjudicate between them.”
Nonetheless we believe that Heidegger’s work is hardly silent on the
question of what is bad and good for people. Indeed, his account of the dan-
gers of the essence of modern technology is an example of just that. In his
1951–52 lectures on thinking, he is clear that the nature of technology is not
just a human fabrication that, given an appropriatemoral constitution, could
be subdued by superior human wisdom (Heidegger 1976). That said, any
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theory are highly contested (e.g., van Buren 1992; Reich 1995; Philipse 1999;
Paley 2000; Volpi 2007). Dreyfus (1993, 293) suggests that Heideggerwould
ﬁnd such a theory to be an example of the problem of enframing, and Drey-
fus argues that, according to Heidegger, true moral knowledge should not
be explicit and disinterested like scientiﬁc knowledge. At the same time, we
appreciate that professional practitioners need to make decisions and that
these decisions should be good ones. If technology is not the panacea for
good practice, and Schön andHeidegger’s alternatives to technology are in-
adequate or too ambiguous, then is there an alternative?another alternative to artistry and art:
PHRONESIS and PRAXIS
are heidegger ’s and schön ’s solutions adequate
for good practice?
Both Schön’s and Heidegger’s critiques of technical rationality and the es-
sence of modern technology suggest we should not place too much conﬁ-
dence in making good practice in caring work reliant on technology. Schön
directly critiques technology as both a tool and knowledge.Heidegger agrees
that these negative assessments of technology are correct and then goes
even further to criticize the essence of modern technology. However, are
the alternatives to the technical rationality and enframing proposed by Schön
and Heidegger adequate for good practice in human services? Moreover,
is artistry including reﬂective practice (Schön) or art as the true essence
of technology as a bringing forth or poiesis (Heidegger) the way to achieve
good practice in social, youth, and community work? Many authors have
critiqued Schön’s work on reﬂective practice (e.g., Clandinin and Connelly
1986; Bleakley 1999; Newman 1999; Johns 2004) and Heidegger’s account
of the essence of modern technology, especially as it appears in The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology (e.g., Feenberg 2002, 2005; Harman 2009; Riis
2009; Ihde 2010). These assessments suggest that Schön’s and Heidegger’s
proposals are not what good practice in caring work requires, and we do
not revisit these critiques here. Instead,we explore another possibility that
is absent in Schön’s and Heidegger’s alternatives to technology and that is
also typically missing from the examinations of these authors’ work. This
other alternative to technology, which is a gap in Schön’s and Heidegger’s
Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice | 341work on technology, is Aristotle’s intellectual virtue called phronesis and its
corresponding form of action known as praxis.
Schön (1987) acknowledges that he did not explore wisdom per se.
Schön (1987, xiii) writes, “I would like to say what I have not tried to do
in this book. I have not considered how the teaching of applied science
might best be combined with a reﬂective practicum. . . . I say little here
about wisdom.” At the same time, Schön (1987, xiii) argues, “I believe that
education for reﬂective practice, though not a sufﬁcient condition for wise
or moral practice, is certainly a necessary one.” We agree that reﬂective
practice can have a role to play in achieving good practice, but it is not
enough on its own. Elizabeth A. Kinsella (2012) similarly suggests that this
is a gap in Schön’s work and proposes an elaboration of Schön’s reﬂective
practice in light of phronesis.
Heidegger’s questioning reinvigorates a mode of revealing the real that
the ancient Greeks called techne, or art, which Heidegger compares to the
current mode of revealing, which he describes as enframing. Moreover,
Heidegger focuses on the essence of technology and its ontological implica-
tions rather than on ethical or practical questions, such as how one should
live or what one should do. Donald E. Polkinghorne (2004, 44) argues,
“What is left out of Heidegger’s analysis of technology is phronesis.”13 Rich-
ard Bernstein (1983; 1991, 120) agrees that Heidegger passes over Aristotle’s
phronesis and praxis inTheQuestionConcerning Technology andotherwork,
and he makes the case that this “striking silence” by Heidegger is a signif-
icant gap. “The entire rhetorical construction of ‘the Question Concerning
Technology’ seduces us into thinking that the only alternative to the threat-
ening danger of Gestell [Enframing] is poiēsis. It excludes and conceals the
possible response of phronēsis and praxis” (Bernstein 1991, 122). Similarly,
according to Polkinghorne (2004, 44), “Turning to Aristotle in ‘The Ques-13. Heidegger was deeply engaged with Aristotle prior to the publication of Being and
Time (e.g., see Heidegger [1922/1923] 2007, [1924/1925] 2003, [1924] 2009, 1962). Many au-
thors make the case that Aristotle’s ethics and Aristotle’s concept of phronesis are central to
Heidegger’s ontology (e.g., Sheehan 1975; Volpi 1992; Kisiel 1993; Coltman 1998; Weidenfeld
2011; Thanassas 2012). For example, according toRobert Bernasconi (1989),Heidegger has four
equivalent ideas to Aristotle’s phronesis—circumspection, understanding, resoluteness, and
conscience. At the same time, Heidegger’s interpretations and translations of Aristotle are both
criticized and hotly debated (e.g., Bernasconi 1986; Gonzalez 1997, 2006; Brogan 1989, 2005;
Taminiaux 2002; Kisiel and Sheehan 2007). However, Heidegger does not deploy phronesis
as an alternative to the essence of modern technology.
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bring-forth . . . Heidegger omitted the other way of thinking, phronesis,
which Aristotle describes in the same section [of Nichomachean Ethics]. . . .
Gadamer has proposed that phronesis enables us to respond to the dominance
of contemporary technology in our lives.” And Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975,
1979, [1960] 2004) is not the only person to argue just that. For example,
other students of Heidegger’s, in particular Hannah Arendt (1958), make a
similar point. Moreover, many of Heidegger’s students and many others who
were subsequently inﬂuenced by Heidegger and his students speciﬁcally
pursue phronesis and praxis—concepts that Heidegger introduced to many
of his students in the 1920s—in ways contrary to how Heidegger appropri-
ated these concepts in his own work. Lawrence J. Hatab (2000) also ob-
serves Heidegger’s failure to consider praxis. Hatab (2000, 203) argues:
“Another way to understand the shortcomings of Heidegger’s political vi-
sion involves his preference for poiesis over praxis, for creative bring-forth
over engaged social practice. . . .For all his interest in Aristotle’s ethics,Hei-
degger never followed through on Aristotle’s praxis.” Francisco J.Gonzalez
(2006) helps explain this failure by making the case that Heidegger trans-
forms and distorts Aristotle’s meaning of praxis.PHRONESIS and PRAXIS
So what are phronesis and praxis? And how can phronesis and praxis help
us to conceptualize and pursue good practice in the social services in ways
that avoid the problems associated with technical rationality and enfram-
ing? To describe phronesis and praxis, it is useful to return to Aristotle, who
was the ﬁrst to characterize these ideas, in particular in his Nichomachean
Ethics. Before we do that, it is important to note that Aristotle lived almost
2,400 years ago when life was very different, and some authors, most nota-
bly Foucault (1984) and Jürgen Habermas (1993), resist looking to the an-
cient Greeks for an ethical theory for contemporary times.14 On the other
hand, many other authors, including Georg W. F. Hegel ([1807] 1977), Hei-
degger ([1924/1925] 2003), Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Jacques Derrida14. Habermas (1973, 1993) acknowledges Aristotle’s distinctions between phronesis, techne,
and episteme; however, he does not agree that phronesis is the best response to the problems
posed by modern technology, technique, and a technical interest in the practical and political
realms.
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ancient Greeks, and particularly to Aristotle, to help answer critical ques-
tions.We follow these authors’ lead and believe that there is value in explor-
ing the possibilities afforded by ancient ideas to assist with understanding
and dealing with modern problems, and this includes the problem that we
are addressing. Many other authors agree, and Richard Bernstein (1986),
Shirley Grundy (1987), Joseph Dunne (1997, 2005), Jennifer White (2007,
Stephen Kemmis and Tracey J. Smith (2008), Bill Green (2009), Elizabeth A.
Kinsella and Allan Pitman (2012), Anna C. Petersén and Jan I. Olsson (2015),
and Jon Ord (2016) are among those who suggest that phronesis and praxis
offer possibilities for inspiring new kinds of professional practice that at-
tempt to avoid the kinds of problems that our critique of technology identiﬁes.
Aristotle (2009) discusses phronesis and praxis most signiﬁcantly in
Book VI of Nichomachean Ethics. The way in which Aristotle (2009) de-
scribes phronesis and praxis that is most relevant to our purposes is by re-
lating and distinguishing these ideas from two other concepts that are also
coupled—techne and poiesis. David Ross and Lesley Brown’s (Aristotle
2009) translation and interpretation of Nichomachean Ethics, which is a
traditional version of the text, translates phronesis as “practical wisdom,”
praxis as “acting,” techne as “art,” and poiesis as “making.” Tomaintain con-
sistency in our text, we continue to use the ancient Greek terms.15 One
thing that phronesis and techne, as different intellectual virtues or types
of knowledge, and praxis and poiesis, as different sorts of human activity,
share is that they relate to variable things or matters that can be otherwise,
rather than invariable things or unchanging objects (Aristotle 2009). If
we accept that human services respond to variable things or matters that
can be otherwise, rather than invariable things or unchanging objects, then
we need to decide whether social services are better characterized or re-
vealed as a praxis guided by phronesis, or as a poiesis guided by techne.
To help answer this question, we can look to Aristotle’s descriptions
of and distinctions between phronesis and praxis, and techne and poiesis.15. According to Robert Bernasconi (1986, 111), Aristotle does not offer a sustained ac-
count of the distinction between praxis and poiesis because the distinction was already well
known to Aristotle and his contemporaries. Bernasconi (1986, 111) adds, “Nor is there any
clear agreement amongst scholars as to how the distinction is understood by him [i.e., Aris-
totle].” We do not follow these controversies and debates and closely follow Ross and
Brown’s interpretation and translation.
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scriptions of modern technology are among the most pertinent. In partic-
ular, Aristotle (2009, 105, 106) argues, “All art [techne] is concerned with
coming into being, i.e., with contriving and considering how something
may come into being . . . and whose origin is in the maker and not in the
thing made . . . [and] making [poiesis] has an end other than itself.” Hei-
degger’s ([1922/1923] 2003, 29) translation and interpretation of Aris-
totle’s Nichomachean Ethics further illuminates the distinctive character
of techne and poiesis. “The object of know-how [techne] is . . . the ﬁnished
product,which arises through a production and a fabrication [poiesis].This
[ﬁnished product] . . . is ‘for the sake of something,’ [Nichomachean Ethics
1139b1], it has a relation to something else. . . . The [ﬁnished product] . . . is
‘for something and for someone’ [Nichomachean Ethics 1139b2]. . . . This
double character entails that the [ﬁnishedwork] of the [production, poiesis]
is for further use, forman [sic].”16 Similar to these descriptions of techne and
poiesis, modern technology is concerned with making or producing things
(typically for some other further use), begins with someone who is separate
from the thing being made, and ends in something that is separate from
the activity of making.We have already identiﬁed the problems with these
ways of knowing and doing for practices in the social services in our cri-
tiques of the technical rationality offered by Schön and the criticisms of en-
framing provided by Heidegger. In light of these problems, human services
should not be considered as poiesis guided by techne.PRAXIS and PHRONESIS and good practice
in human services
This leaves revealing social services as a praxis guided by phronesis. So
why are these better ideas for conceptualizing good practice in the human
services? First, Aristotle (2009, 106) argues that, contrary to poiesis, praxis
cannot have an end other than itself, “for good action [ praxis] itself is its
end.” In other words, in his account of praxis, Aristotle offers a way to con-
ceptualize action that avoids the kinds of problems that our critique of tech-16. We suggest that what can be observed here in Heidegger’s early translation and inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s account of techne inNichomachean Ethics is an original glimpse of what
was to become Heidegger’s theory of enframing in The Question Concerning Technology.
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thing separate to the action; the action is the end. But how is the action
to be good action? This is where phronesis comes in. According to Aristotle
(2009, 106), phronesis is a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with re-
gard to human goods or to the things that are good or bad for human beings.
In other words, phronesis is concerned with deliberation and good judg-
ment regarding how human beings should be and, in particular, how they
should act. Aristotle (2009, 109) adds that because action is concerned with
particulars, phronesis recognizes and needs universal and particular knowl-
edge, especially contingent, context-speciﬁc knowledge.This helps to explain
why Aristotle (2009, xvi, 115–17) argues that there is a close connection be-
tween phronesis and moral virtue.
Second, phronesis is needed and exercised to determine what the vir-
tuous act is in a particular circumstance—or phronesis is the intellectual
reasoning that helps to guide the desire to pursue what is right and avoid
what is wrong, as well as to make good choices regarding states of charac-
ter or the moral virtues in a given instant (Aristotle 2009). Schwartz and
Sharpe’s (2010) account of phronesis captures these key ideas of the con-
cept. “Ethics, said Aristotle . . . was about performing a particular social
practice well—being a good friend or parent or doctor or soldier or citizen
or statesman—and that meant ﬁguring out the right way to do the right
thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particu-
lar time. This is what took practical wisdom [ phronesis]” (Schwartz and
Sharpe 2010, 5–6).Wisnewski (2012, 61–65) agrees that “The virtuous ac-
tion [the action guided by phronesis or praxis] is one done in the right way,
at the right time, to the right person, and with the right kind of knowledge”
(see also Anscombe 1958; Bessant 2009; Eikeland 2014; Cheung 2016). Ac-
cording to Aristotle (2009), phronesis is the intellectual virtue best suited
to guide praxis. And praxis, as a type of activity, is often understood as human
action oriented toward some idea of the good that, while guided by univer-
sals, emerges in response to particulars or the context-speciﬁc contingen-
cies of the given situation of practice itself (Polkinghorne 2004). Because
the end of praxis is thought through and determined with the aid of phro-
nesis in the speciﬁc context of action itself, rather than the end being a sci-
entiﬁcally produced, predetermined rule or theory to be correctly applied
in practice, and because the end of praxis is not separate from and for the
sake of something outside the action itself, as it is in the case of poiesis
guided by techne, praxis and phronesis offer a way to conceptualize good
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with technical rationality and enframing.the role of technology
Where does this leave technology? More to the point, should technology
still have a role in achieving good practice in human services? Some au-
thors are suspicious of technology and suggest that techne and poiesis have
no role to play in association with phronesis and praxis in professional
practice (Arendt 1963; Carr 2004). This is because techne and poiesis are
oriented toward making, manipulating, and controlling. For example, Da-
vid Hamilton (2005, 40) argues: “Through techne one sees nature as some-
thing to be used and controlled. . . . Both pre-modern and modern technol-
ogies regard nature as something to be used.” In other words, technology
can be associatedwith the dangers of enframing nomatter the era in which
it is located.Other authors argue that technology still has a role to play and
that pragmatically it is difﬁcult to think about people and practice in mod-
ern times without technology (Thomson 2009). If technology has a role to
play in achieving good practice in the caring professions, then what should
it be? Most accounts that support technology having a role suggest that
technology should be in the service of and subordinate to phronesis and
praxis (Dunne 1997;Walker andWalker 2012; Carr 2014).This is a relation-
ship to technology that Dreyfus (1993) suggests is supported byHeidegger’s
response to the technological understanding of being.This suggestion also
makes sense in light of an assumption or claim that phronesis and praxis
rest on: that each instance of practice is unique and practice is never the
same thing twice. A relevant implication of this account of practice is that
a critical aspect of exercising phronesis and doing praxis is that people have
to decide in each instance of practice whether to use technology and, if so,
what technology to use, when to use it, and why and how to use it.conclusion
We make the case that the idea of technology as a tool that includes new
digital technologies has become fundamental to, and embedded in,ways in
which good practice in the social services is conceptualized and pursued.We
also argue that technology as knowledge, and in particular as a technical-
rational conceptualization of knowledge, has been, and continues to be, ev-
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tation that good practice in practices of care are achieved with the correct
application of theory produced by rigorous scientiﬁc research.We observe
that this is evident in the current emphasis on evidence-based practice rooted
in the social sciences.
Nevertheless, we argue that there are signiﬁcant critiques of the rela-
tions between good human service practice and technologies. In particular,
we examine the work of Schön and Heidegger and agree with these au-
thors’ suggestions that technical rationality and modern technology are
not theway to achieve good practice in the human service professions. Fur-
thermore, we acknowledge the ways in which Heidegger’s account of the
essence of modern technology problematizes conceptualizations and ap-
proaches to good practice that articulate or assume an efﬁcacy, in particu-
lar because any claims or hopes of effectiveness, outcomes, or results can
be revealed as examples of the problem of enframing people.We explore
the alternatives to technical rationality and modern technology provided
by Schön and Heidegger.We report that Schön advocates artistry or artful
practice, which he suggests involves reﬂective practice. And we identify
that Heidegger recommends a reinvigoration of art as conceived by the An-
cient Greeks in the concept of techne.
However, we are not convinced that the proposals offered by Heideg-
ger and Schön are what good practice in human services requires. At the
same time, and in light of Heidegger’s and Foucault’s perspectives of social
services, we acknowledge that accounts of good practice need to avoid re-
verting to a technical simplicity and efﬁcacy. We take up this ambitious
challenge and embark on a prefatory project of suggesting an alternative
conceptualization of good social service practice. In particular,we explore
another prospect that is absent in Schön and Heidegger’s alternatives to
technology and that is often missing from the critiques of these authors’
work.We draw on Aristotle’s account of the intellectual virtues to provide
an alternative to techne and artistry.We introduce phronesis and praxis as
other possibilities for inspiring new kinds of practice in the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury.We emphasize that phronesis and praxis are often characterized as dif-
ferent ways of knowing and doing compared to technical forms of knowl-
edge and action, and we emphasize these distinctions.
Although they are both signiﬁcant contributors, Heidegger and Schön
are only two writers who have thought about technology and its implica-
tions. Other accounts are worthy of attention (e.g., Feenberg 2002, 2005;
| Social Service Review348Latour 2002; Ihde and Selinger 2003; Olsen et al. 2009; Verbeek 2009;
Ihde 2010). Attending to this body of work would go a long way toward
further inquiries about what role, if any, technology could or should play
in achieving goodpractice in human services. Further research is also needed
on the question of the relationship between praxis, phronesis, and modern
science and technology for good practice in the caring professions.note
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